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I.   INTRODUCTION 
  
This paper addresses the gender bias presented by the disparate treatment of sex and 
violence under current obscenity jurisprudence.  Part II examines the legal evolution of obscenity 
law and identifies the ways in which sex and violence are handled differently.  Specifically, I 
note that sexual works may readily be regulated as obscenity, while violent works unequivocally 
may not.  Part III explains that this disparate treatment is the result of entrenched gender bias 
about the way men and women “should” react to sex and violence, and notes the hypocrisy of 
failing to apply the same reasoning to assessments of violent versus sexual material.   In this part, 
I describe the prevailing notions of masculinity and femininity, as they have been identified by 
sociological and legal scholars.  I then explain the three principal ways in which obscenity can be 
seen as a manifestation of gender bias, all of which rely on the identified sexual stereotypes.  
II.   THE STATE OF OBSCENITY  
 
A. The “Inherent Morality” Standard 
 
Material is currently pronounced obscene if it:  (1) appeals to the prurient interest, as 
determined by the average person applying community standards; (2) portrays sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way, as defined by applicable state law; and (3) lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.
1
  As it stands, then, the current constitutional test for obscenity looks 
solely to whether the content of a particular work sufficiently comports with the prevailing moral 
standards of the community in which it is sold.  Notably, there is no reference made to whether a 
potentially obscene work gives rise to immoral behavior or, indeed, whether it causes any legally 
                                                 
1 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).   
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cognizable harm at all.  As one scholar writes: 
[A]n obscenity prosecution does not require that anyone actually be offended by 
the material itself. Many obscenity prosecutions, particularly at the federal level, 
are initiated after elaborate investigations by law enforcement officers who 
actively seek out material that, but for the investigation, would probably be seen 
only by willing customers. Thus, although obscenity can be judged only with 
reference to a community standard, obscenity is a quality that inheres in the 
material itself. Material is obscene, and therefore subject to prosecution, solely 
because it has the potential to offend.
2
 
 
A work’s standalone moral character is dispositive of its legal status as obscenity.  As such, this 
standard may appropriately be called an “inherent morality” standard.3  
In First Amendment jurisprudence, obscenity is the only category of unprotected speech 
that is held to the “inherent morality” standard.  That is, obscenity is the only speech excluded 
from the First Amendment solely because of an inherent characteristic—offensiveness—where 
all other categories of unprotected speech incorporate within their constitutional definitions some 
kind of tangible social harm.
4
   While in practice, offending community standards may give rise 
to social harms, those identified within the obscenity line of cases are characterized as 
“secondary effects” of obscenity; social harms are not the primary concern that obscenity laws 
are designed to handle.
5
  Instead, obscenity law addresses only the “moral harm”6 that may fall 
                                                 
2James Peterson, Behind the Curtain of Privacy: How Obscenity Law Inhibits the Expression of Ideas About Sex 
and Gender, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 625, 635 (1998). 
3 See Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Fighting the Pornification of America by Enforcing Obscenity Laws, 23 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 4 (2012) (describing evolution of American obscenity law from English common law standard 
focused on social effect of works to Constitutional standard concerned with content of works). 
4 Compare Miller obscenity test with tests for other categories of unprotected speech: Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969) (Incitement causes imminent unlawful acts); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 586 (1942) 
(Fighting words cause imminent violence/illegal acts); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (Defamation 
causes personal injury); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
(Fraudulent or deceptive commercial speech speech itself violates laws); Masses Publ'g v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (1917) 
(Speech “integral to criminal conduct” enabled commission of conspiracy to commit espionage).   
5 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 42 U.S. 50 (1976) (discussing secondary effects of pornography).  
6 Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT'L. L. 299, 324 (2008) (“Thus, although the Court 
does allude to the (empirically unproven) possibility that obscenity might incite physical harm, the primary state 
interest that the Court invokes is the possibility of moral harm: damage to the ‘quality of life’; injury to ‘the 
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upon the consumer of obscene material as a result of its lackluster “inherent morality.”   
Obscenity is also anomalous in First Amendment jurisprudence because it may be 
regulated in contravention of the fundamental constitutional principle that speech may not be 
suppressed merely because it is unpopular or offensive to the community.  The Supreme Court 
has expressly held that “the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason 
for suppressing it.  Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a 
reason for according it constitutional protection.”7  Yet offensiveness is the exact reason given 
for the suppression of obscenity: “Obscene materials have been denied the protection of the First 
Amendment because their content is so offensive to contemporary moral standards.”8  Thus, 
while offensiveness is typically a reason for according constitutional protection, for obscenity it 
is the constitutional basis for suppression.   
Finally, obscenity is an anomaly because it seeks to suppress a particular topic of speech.  
All other unprotected categories are left unprotected because of the effect that they have on the 
recipient(s), with no reference made to the matter being discussed.
9
  For example, “fighting 
words” are outside First Amendment protection because “by their very utterance, [they] inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”10  This constitutional definition is not 
concerned with the topic at hand; fighting words are fighting words whether they concern 
religion, politics, or what the listener had for breakfast.  It is the fact that the listener would be 
“invited to fisticuffs” that renders fighting words unprotected.  In contrast, obscenity laws may 
                                                                                                                                                             
development of the human personality,’ ‘family life,’ and ‘the community as a whole’; and the corruption of ‘a 
decent society.’”). 
7 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). 
8 Id. 
9 See supra, text accompanying note 2.  
10 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).  
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only suppress speech about sex.
11
  A closer look at the evolution of constitutional obscenity 
jurisprudence illuminates why sex receives this “special” treatment.12 
B.  Sex and Violence Under the “Inherent Morality” Standard  
 
The inherent morality standard singles out sexual speech as the only topic deserving of 
the obscenity moniker.
13
  Because the definition of obscenity requires the presence of sexual 
elements, works with sexual elements are necessarily susceptible to overregulation and outright 
ban under color of obscenity law.  Works with sexual elements are thus categorically afforded 
less protection than other works, and the Supreme Court has even intimated that non-obscene 
sexual works may permissibly be given lesser protection than non-sexual works.
14
   
In contrast, it has been exceedingly difficult for states to regulate violent works (or works 
which may offend community mores on other grounds, such as those that are sacrilegious or 
disgusting), even where such works have been empirically shown to increase violent thoughts 
and acts in consumers.
15
  Laws regulating violent speech are presumptively invalid,
16
 even where 
they track the same language as valid laws regulating sexual speech and were adopted under the 
same rationale.
17
  As discussed in Part III below, this disparate treatment is the result of 
entrenched gender bias. 
                                                 
11 See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (“Our cases have been clear that the obscenity 
exception to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of 
‘sexual conduct.’”). 
12 See Part II.B, infra.  
13 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (“Our cases have been clear that the obscenity exception to the First Amendment 
does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of ‘sexual conduct.’”) 
14 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 862–67 (2007) (discussing the multitude 
of separate obscenity tests developed by individual justices from 1957 through 1973, which on the whole tended to 
agree that sexually explicit, non-obscene material “should occupy a subordinate position as ‘lower value’ speech.”).  
15 See, e.g., U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).  
16 Presumptively invalid laws are evaluated under strict scrutiny inquiry, and will be struck down unless passed to 
further a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.   
17 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1579-81 (describing 18 U.S.C. 48, the Congressional Act against animal cruelty, as 
being based on Miller’s obscenity standard, and adopted under the same rationale as was accepted to proscribe child 
pornography).  
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1. Regulation of Sexual Expression  
To justify regulating solely speech about sex, the inherent morality standard relies on an 
“historical consensus” rationale.  The first obscenity law was passed in 1711 in the 
Massachusetts Bay colony, which made it an offense to write, print or publish “any Filthy 
Obscene or Prophane Song, Pamphlet, Libel or Mock-Sermon, in Imitation or in Mimicking of 
Preaching, or any other part of Divine Worship.”18  However, that law dealt principally with 
profanity, not sexual material.  The first reported obscenity case was decided over a century later, 
in 1815.
19
  In 1821, the first obscenity legislation dealing with sexual material was passed.
20
 
However, the current definition of obscenity is originally derived from a famous 1868 English 
case, Regina v. Hicklin.
21
  Under Hicklin, material that tended to “deprave and corrupt those 
whose minds are open to such immoral influences” was deemed obscene and could be banned.22  
The United States Supreme Court, however, disapproved of Hicklin’s Victorian prudery; i.e., that 
its reference point was “the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons” 
rather than the general consuming public.
23
  The Hicklin standard was thus broadened upon the 
Court’s first annunciation of a constitutional obscenity standard in 1957.  In Roth v. United 
States, the Court held that material was deemed obscene by determining “whether to the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken 
as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”24  The Roth Court reasoned that “[i]mplicit in the history 
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social 
                                                 
18 Acts and Laws of Massachusetts Bay 219, 222 (1714). 
19 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sharpless, 1815 WL 1297 (Dec. 1, 1815).   
20 Conn. Stat. Laws 165 (1821). 
21 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957).  
22 R. v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 (Q.B.) 360, 371 (1868). 
23 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.  
24 Id. 
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importance.”25  In other words, the Roth Court deemed material appealing to the prurient interest 
“no-value” speech, and averred such speech has always been excluded from First Amendment 
protection.  As the standard thus shifted from the common law to constitutional law, the test for 
judging obscenity shifted from its social effect to its contents.
26
 
However, the Roth obscenity standard, with its ambiguous references to “contemporary 
community standards” and “appeals to the prurient interest” proved nearly impossible for the 
courts to interpret with any regularity.
27
  Indeed, as one scholar observed, “[b]etween 1957 and 
1973, the Court issued thirteen decisions on the issue of obscenity. Those thirteen decisions 
produced fifty-five separate opinions.”28  Regardless, after sixteen years “during which [the] 
Court struggled with the intractable obscenity problem,”29 despite “considerable vacillation over 
the proper definition of obscenity,”30 and notwithstanding Justice Stewart’s oft-quoted aphorism 
(“I know it when I see it”),31 the Court put an end to such haphazard results by essentially 
adopting the Roth test wholesale in the paradigm obscenity case of Miller v. California.
32
   
Under the Miller test, material is obscene if it:  (1) appeals to the prurient interest, as 
determined by the average person applying community standards; (2) portrays sexual conduct in 
a patently offensive way, as defined by applicable state law; and (3) lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.
33
  The 1973 Miller test remains, essentially unchanged, the 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Hatch, supra note 3, at 4.  
27 See Boyce, supra note 6 (discussing evolution of obscenity law).  
28 Peterson, supra note 2, at 629. 
29 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982) (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 
704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
30 Id.  
31 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to the category of “hard-core” 
pornography). 
32 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  
33 Id. 
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operative constitutional standard for determining obscenity today.
34
   
Two later obscenity cases merit brief discussion:  the 1968 case of Ginsberg v. New 
York,
35
 in which the Court held that non-obscene sexual material could be considered obscenity 
as applied to minors, and the 1982 case of New York v. Ferber,
36
 in which the Court established 
that child pornography is outside the First Amendment.  Ginsberg involved a New York statute 
criminalizing the “knowing sale to a minor (a) of any picture which depicts nudity and which is 
harmful to minors or (b) any magazine which contains such pictures and which, taken as a 
whole, is harmful to minors.”37 “Harmful to minors” was then defined by applying the three 
Miller factors as “to minors.”38  The Court upheld the petitioner’s conviction for selling “girlie 
magazines”39 to a sixteen year old, holding that  
[m]aterial which is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily 
constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children.  In 
other words, the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary 
according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from 
whom it is quarantined.
40
   
 
The Court presented two rationales for its holding, stating that the Constitution has long been 
interpreted to recognize parents’ interest in directing the upbringing of their children, and that the 
state has a justifiable interest in the well-being of its minors.
41
 Generally, then, the Ginsberg 
Court merely reaffirmed its reasoning that speech about sex may be outside the First Amendment 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
35 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
36 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 751 (1982).  
37 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631–32 (quotation marks omitted).  
38 Id. (“‘Harmful to minors’ means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, 
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse, when it: (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, 
shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community 
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social 
importance for minors.”). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 636 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966)). 
41 See id.  
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when it lacks “social value” and is offensive to the community.  The novelty was that the 
Ginsberg holding established that the constitutional definition of any “unprotected matter may 
vary” according to the intended audience.   
The Court has characterized its holding in Ginsberg as merely “sustain[ing] state power 
to exclude material [already] defined as obscenity”42 and “simply adjust[ing] the definition of 
obscenity to social realities,”43 rather than establishing a new category of unprotected speech.  Of 
course, whether historically non-obscene material could be “defined as obscenity” was the 
precise issue determined by the Court in Ginsberg; the Court’s characterization was thus 
dispositive.  That is, by stating that the magazines at issue were within a sub-category of 
obscenity (obscenity as to minors), the law at issue was presumed a valid content-based 
restriction on material wholly outside of the First Amendment and was thus upheld under a 
rational basis test.
44
  If the Ginsberg Court had considered themselves creating a new category of 
unprotected speech (obscenity as to minors), it would have had to apply the strict scrutiny test 
required in all cases involving content-based restrictions on protected speech.  
In New York v. Ferber,
45
 the Court identified—allegedly for the last time46—a new 
category of speech wholly outside the First Amendment:  child pornography.  New York had 
passed a law making it a felony “to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, 
deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or 
advertise . . . a sexual performance by a child . . . which includes sexual conduct by a child less 
                                                 
42 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (emphasis added). 
43 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir. 2009). 
44 Id.  
45 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
46 See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (No new categories of speech may be excluded 
from the First Amendment “without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if 
heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription[.]”).  
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than sixteen years of age.”47  The Supreme Court upheld the statute, generically concluding that 
“[w]hen a definable class of material . . . bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of 
children engaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck 
and that it is permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First 
Amendment.”48  The Court reasoned that the state’s interest in preventing sexual abuse of the 
children forced to make pornographic videos, together with the patently criminal nature of the 
underlying conduct and the inability of law enforcement to combat the underlying crime without 
targeting commercial distribution of the videos, “overwhelmingly outweighed” the de minimus, 
if any, social value child pornography offered.
49
 The Court further concluded that it was “not 
rare”50 in Supreme Court jurisprudence to allow a content-based classification when “the evil to 
be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no 
process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”51  Finally, the Court took care to distinguish 
child pornography from obscenity: 
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated 
in Miller, but may be compared to it for the purpose of clarity. The Miller 
formulation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of fact need not find that 
the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not 
required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; 
and the material at issue need not be considered as a whole. We note that the 
distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise 
obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual 
reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment protection.
52
 
 
In distinguishing unprotected child pornography from “other depictions of [non-obscene] sexual 
                                                 
47 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751.  
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 763; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942), and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).  
51 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763 (citing Young v. Am. Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)). 
52 Id. at 764–65.  
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conduct . . . which do not involve live performances,” the Court made clear that it was choosing 
to categorically exclude live performance-based child pornography because the ancillary and 
corollary harms to children outweighed the value of its expression.  Thus, Ferber instructs that 
while obscenity is solely concerned with addressing moral harm, other sexual expression may be 
permissibly excluded from the First Amendment on the grounds that the resulting social harms 
outweigh its social value.  
2. Why Offensiveness vis-à-vis Sex Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague 
Notably, the standard for obscenity was criticized from the outset.  In Roth, a dissenting 
Justice Douglas attacked the standard for singling out sex as the only topic of discussion 
punishable for merely being discussed, its reliance on majority rule, and its condemnation of 
thoughts without acts.
53
  Justice Douglas disapproved that the standard made “the legality of a 
publication turn on the purity of thought which a book or a tract instills in the mind of the 
reader,” and imposed punishment “for thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor antisocial 
conduct.”54  He found the reliance on community standards inapposite to established First 
Amendment jurisprudence, observing that such a standard “would not be an acceptable one if 
religion, economics, politics or philosophy were involved.”55  Why should it be acceptable where 
the topic is sex?  The answer must be inferred from context, as the Court provided none.
56
   
Apparently, it was accepted fact in 1957 that there existed a general consensus on what 
was “normal” sexual conduct and what was “offensive” sexual conduct.  In Roth, the Court 
dismissed concerns that the new obscenity standard was unconstitutionally vague, holding that 
                                                 
53 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 509-10 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).   
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 512.  
56 See Boyce, supra note 6 (“What is most striking about U.S. obscenity jurisprudence is that the Court has made 
little effort to supply a rationale for the community standards test.”). 
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“the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured 
by common understanding and practices.  These words . . . give adequate warning of the conduct 
proscribed and mark boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the 
law.”57  The Court likewise quoted Roth’s “common understanding and practices” language in 
concluding that the test enunciated in Miller “provide[d] fair notice” of what was illegal.58  And 
the Court again relied on that language in Hamling v. United States,
59
 when it concluded that a 
pre-Miller obscenity law was not unconstitutionally vague.
60
   Thus, the current law of obscenity 
depends for its meaning, and ultimately its constitutionality, on the existence of a “common 
understanding” regarding what depictions of sexual conduct meet the elements of the obscenity 
standard.  As discussed in Part Two, infra, the “common understanding” necessary to 
interpreting Miller incorporates long-standing biases about gender roles and proper sexual 
expression.     
Despite running contrary to First Amendment principles, reliance on an assumed 
“common understanding” of what is offensive sexual conduct is permitted to stand as a test for 
constitutionality for one reason:  tradition.  The Supreme Court finally articulated a reason for 
treating sex differently than other potentially offensive subjects in 2011, holding that speech 
about sexual conduct may be suppressed because we have traditionally suppressed it.
61
  Even 
more shocking—particularly in light of Miller’s reference to “contemporary community 
standards”—the Court has unequivocally stated that no new topics may be added to the 
definition of obscenity nor may new categories of speech may be excluded from the First 
                                                 
57 Roth, 354 U.S. at 491 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  
58 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 & n.10. 
59 418 U.S. 87 (1974).  
60 Id. at 110–11. 
61 U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (“[T]he First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the 
content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a freedom to disregard these traditional 
limitations.”) 
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Amendment, unless such speech has a well-established history of being suppressed.
62
  As a 
result, states are compelled to advance outdated, historic notions of morality solely because they 
are historic, and are further disallowed from adopting new standards that reflect contemporary 
notions of morality, despite that the constitutional law as articulated in Miller requires as much.     
3. Regulation of Violent Expression 
In general, the Supreme Court has refused to extend its concept of obscenity to include 
violent works, and has further refused to find violent expression outside the First Amendment on 
any grounds.
63
  Two recent decisions in particular highlight the hypocrisy of holding speech 
about sex and violence to different standards, despite that the justifications for excluding sexual 
speech from the First Amendment are directly applicable to violent speech, and that violent 
speech often comports with the inherent morality standard.  
In the handful of Supreme Court cases addressing the propriety of state regulation of 
violent speech, one trends stands out:  the Court consistently strikes down violent speech 
regulations on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness.
64
  In so ruling, the Court reasons that no 
community could possibly come to a consensus on when violent speech is too offensive, and 
therefore that laws regulating violent speech which track the Miller obscenity language could 
never “give men adequate notice of the conduct proscribed.”65  The Court adopts this non-
consensus view about violent speech even where the state legislation at issue was passed by 
                                                 
62 See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (No new categories of speech may be excluded 
from the First Amendment “without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if 
heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription[.]”). 
63 Id. (rejecting attempts to analogize violent speech to obscenity, child pornography, speech integral to criminal 
conduct, and attempts to carve out a new category of unprotected speech).  
64 See, e.g., Winters, Stevens, Entm’t Merch.  
65 See, e.g., U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
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popular vote,
66
 while unabashedly holding that “common understanding and practices” about sex 
protect the Miller standard from unconstitutional vagueness.
67
   
In the first case, United States v. Stevens, the respondent made a facial challenge to a 
Congressional Act regulating animal crush videos (“Section 48”).  Section 48 criminalized the 
commercial creation, sale, or possession of any depiction of “animal cruelty,” defined where a 
living animal was “intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.”68   In a nod to 
Miller’s standard, Section 48 covered only those depictions of conduct that were illegal pursuant 
to federal or state statute (a reference to Miller’s reliance on “community standards” and 
“applicable state law” to define the contours of offensiveness), but exempted from coverage any 
depiction with “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or 
artistic value.”69  These facts provided an excellent stepping stone for the Court to hold violent 
material within the obscenity definition, because crush videos—which “depict women slowly 
crushing animals to death with their bare feet or while wearing high heeled shoes, sometimes 
while talking to the animals in a kind of dominatrix patter over the cries and squeals of the 
animals, obviously in great pain.”70—“appeal to persons with a very specific sexual fetish who 
find them sexually arousing or otherwise exciting.”71  That is, the videos, while violent, also 
appealed to the prurient interest in sex.  However, the Court did not even mention prurience in 
Stevens and ultimately struck down Section 48 for overbreadth.
72
  
First, the Court stated that Section 48 was presumptively invalid because it regulated 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Entm’t Merch., 131 S. Ct. at 2729 (holding that there can be no consensus on what violence is offensive 
even where the statute at issue, Cal. Civ.Code Ann. §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2009), was passed by popular vote).  
67 See Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 110–11 (1974). 
68 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 106–397, p. 2 (1999)).  
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
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expression based on its violent content, and violent expression is not a traditional category of 
unprotected speech.
73
  The Government argued that violent expression should be categorically 
excluded from the First Amendment, based on the Court’s well-established “no-value speech” 
rationale.
74
  The Court responded that lack of social value has never been “the basis” for 
categorical exclusion, and thus cannot be grounds for carving out a new category of unprotected 
speech.
75
  It stated that any prior discussion of the low social value of unprotected speech was 
merely a description of that speech, not justification for removing its protection.
76
   
Here, the Stevens Court is just wrong.  While accurately stating that descriptions of the 
excluded categories as low-value “do not set forth a test that may be applied as a general 
matter”77 and that categorical exclusion “has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit 
analysis,”78 the Stevens Court conflated “basis” and “test” for its own ends.  Yes, a cost-benefit 
test has never been the constitutional standard for excluding an entire category of speech from 
the First Amendment.  But it does not follow that a social cost-benefit analysis has not been at 
the heart of the justification for every categorical exclusion. 
In arguing that low social value has never been the basis for exclusion, the Stevens Court 
regurgitated oft-quoted
79
 language from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
80
 but mischaracterized its 
context as description rather than justification.  The Chaplinsky Court described unprotected 
                                                 
73 Stevens, 130 U.S. at 1585.   
74 Id. (The Government contended that “depictions of illegal acts of animal cruelty that are made, sold, or possessed 
[solely] for commercial gain necessarily lack expressive value, and may accordingly be regulated as unprotected 
speech.”). 
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.  
79 See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952),  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Virginia Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
80 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
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speech as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach 
of the peace,” but then reasoned that they are categorically excluded because “such utterances 
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.”81  Similarly, the Roth Court unequivocally stated that obscenity is 
permissibly removed from First Amendment protection because it is “no-value” speech.82  The 
reasoning behind excluding incitement, defamation, commercial fraud, and speech integral to 
criminal conduct is self-evident:  the First Amendment does not protect speech with such low 
social value that it is by definition a crime or the proximate cause of a crime.  Finally, the Court 
has described its First Amendment jurisprudence as frequently being based on a social cost-
benefit analysis, when stating in Ferber that it was “not rare”83 for the Court to allow a content-
based classification when “the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive 
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”84  It appears 
that the Stevens Court took great pains to characterize its precedential justifications as 
descriptions in order to avoid the conclusion that speech with no social value has historically 
been excluded from the First Amendment on that “basis” (though perhaps not by that “test”).  
After refusing to find a new category of unprotected speech for lack of historical 
precedent, the Stevens Court next dismissed the Government’s attempts to analogize regulation 
of crush videos to existing unprotected categories.  The obvious analog is obscenity; Section 48 
criminalized (1) commercial depictions of “animal cruelty,” as defined therein; (2) where those 
                                                 
81 Id. at 572. 
82 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection 
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.”).  
83 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763 (citing Young v. Am. Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964), Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 
(1952)).  
84 Id.  
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depictions are illegal pursuant to federal or state statute; and (3) where the depictions lack 
“serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.”85  
Replacing sexual conduct with animal cruelty, then, Section 48 mirrors Miller with few changes.  
The first Miller prong is satisfied by Section 48 in the case of crush videos, though the Court did 
not so much as mention their prurient nature.
86
  By requiring the underlying conduct be illegal 
under state or federal law, Section 48 follows Miller’s second prong.  That is, it is axiomatic that 
only those acts which are offensive to social mores beyond question are made illegal.
87
  Finally, 
Section 48’s exceptions clause was an expansion of Miller’s:  it exempted material with serious 
religious, educational, journalistic, or historical value, in addition to that with serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.
88
   
Despite tracking the constitutionally-approved Miller standard, the Court found all three 
of Section 48’s prongs unconstitutionally broad.  First, the Court held the definition of depictions 
of “animal cruelty” too broad because it included the “intentional killing . . . or wounding” of 
animals, which can be done humanely.
89
  The Court rejected that “killing or wounding” should 
be construed together with the requirements that the underlying conduct to be cruel and illegal, 
because neither term was facially ambiguous (an apparent pre-requisite for construing statutes as 
a whole).
90
  This is inapposite to its interpretation of Miller; i.e., those displays of sexual conduct 
(one element of Miller) which not appeal to the prurient interest (a separate element of Miller) do 
not fall within the definition of obscenity because Miller’s elements are read together. 
Second, the Court asserted that a lack of consensus as to what constitutes a depiction of 
                                                 
85 Id.  
86 See generally United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).  
87 Miller itself proves this, because state law “defines” what is patently offensive.  
88 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.  
89 Id. at 1585 (using the humane slaughter of livestock as an example).  
90 Id.  
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“cruelty” rendered illegality an unconstitutionally broad reference point.  The Court averred that 
“although there may be ‘a broad societal consensus’ against cruelty to animals . . . there is 
substantial disagreement on what types of conduct are properly regarded as cruel.”91 As proof of 
non-consensus, the Court contrasted hunting regulations in several states,
92
 ignoring that the 
educational and historical value of hunting depictions would exempt them from Section 48 and 
that all 50 states have laws criminalizing (and therefore defining) animal cruelty.  Why, then, 
didn't the Court contrast animal cruelty laws rather than hunting laws to show non-consensus?  I 
believe that the Court wanted to garner as much support for its conclusion as possible, and in 
light of the venerable position hunting holds in this nation’s psyche, arguing that hunting would 
be adversely affected by Section 48 would do just that.
93
  A blanket assertion of non-consensus 
as to what is “cruel” is unreasonable when resulting from comparison of irrelevant hunting 
statutes; irresponsible when made in the face of available data appropriate to assessing a 
consensus about cruelty; and hypocritical when compared to the constitutionally-sanctioned 
presumption of a consensus regarding what sexual conduct is prurient and offensive.  
Finally, the Court found the exceptions clause too broad.  In short, the Stevens Court 
rejected the Miller standard of “serious” social value as unreasonably high for non-sexual 
material, despite its constitutionality when applied to sexual material:  “In Miller we held that 
serious value shields depictions of sex from regulation as obscenity. . . . We did not, however, 
determine that serious value could be used as a general precondition to protecting other types of 
speech in the first place.”94  Again, the Stevens Court contorts language in its favor: despite that 
Section 48’s exceptions clause is just that—a list of exceptions to the statute, akin to Miller’s 
                                                 
91 Id. at 1589.  
92 Id. 
93 See Part III.A.1, infra (discussing influence of hegemonic masculinity on the nation’s psyche). 
94 Id. at 1591 (emphasis in original).  
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exceptions—the Court incorrectly characterizes it as a “general precondition to protecti[on]” to 
weaken the analogy to obscenity.   
The second case, Brown v. Entertainment Merchant’s Association,95 was handed down 
one year after Stevens.  In Brown, the Supreme Court struck down a California law that limited 
minors’ access to violent video games on two main grounds.  First, the law was a content-based 
restriction on speech which was neither a “simple adjustment” to an existing category of 
unprotected speech, nor merited establishing a new unprotected category.
96
  Thus, it was subject 
to strict scrutiny.  Second, the Court held that the state’s purported interest in preventing 
psychological harm to minors caused by playing violent video was not supported by empirical 
data.
97
  Moreover, even if the law did prevent some such harm, it both under- and over-inclusive 
and hence not narrowly tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny analysis.
98
  
The California law forbid the sale or rental of a “violent video game” to a minor without 
the consent of a parent or other guardian, covering only games in which a player's “range of 
options” included “killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human 
being.”99 Furthermore, the ban was limited to depictions of violence which (i) “appeal[] to a 
deviant or morbid interest of minors,” as found by a “reasonable person, considering the game as 
a whole”; (ii) are “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community” for minors; and 
(iii) prevent the game as a whole from having “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value for minors.”100 The only differences, then, between the California law and Miller’s 
obscenity standard is the replacement of “prurient interest” with “deviant or morbid interest,” the 
                                                 
95 130 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).  
96 Id. at 2735. 
97 Id. at 2738. 
98 Id. at 2738–41. 
99 Cal. Civ. Code § 1746 (West 2009). 
100 Id. § 1746(d)(1)(A). 
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replacement of “contemporary community standards” with a “reasonable person” standard, and 
the addition of language limiting the inquiry “as to minors.”  Of course, the law also did not 
specifically target sexual conduct; indeed, that the law attempted to prevent non-sexual harm to 
minors was its downfall.   
Unlike Ginsberg, the Court said, the regulation on violent video games “does not adjust 
the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed 
for adults is not uncritically applied to children.”101 The statute that was upheld in Ginsberg was, 
the Court emphasizes, “a prohibition on the sale to minors of sexual material that would be 
obscene from the perspective of a child.”102  In other words, the Brown Court held that rational 
legislative judgments about what materials cause moral harm to minors will be upheld if 
regulating sexual materials, because the regulation of sexual materials is grounded in traditional 
obscenity jurisprudence.
103
 And just as the Court rejected the attempt in Stevens to “shoehorn” 
speech about animal cruelty into the category of the “obscene,” it rejected California's “attempt 
to make violent-speech regulation look like obscenity regulation”:104 
Our cases have been clear that the obscenity exception to the First Amendment 
does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of 
“sexual conduct” . . . Our opinion in Winters made clear that violence is not part 
of the obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated.
105
 
 
Notably, the Brown Court unambiguously interpreted Winters to stand for the proposition that all 
violent speech constitutes “no indecency or obscenity heretofore known to the law.”106 This 
reading is flawed.  That Winters quote was not intended to say that violent speech can never be 
                                                 
101 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 2736 (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)).  
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735.  
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regulated in the absence of precedent, nor that violent speech is never obscene, but rather to 
explain that a lack of precedent rendered that particular statute unconstitutionally vague.
107
  
Specifically, the Winters Court found that the language criminalizing the sale of violent stories 
only where such stories were “so massed [i.e., compiled] as to incite to crime” could not give 
notice of the illegal behavior because that phrase had “no technical or common law meaning. 
Nor can the meaning be gained from the section as a whole or the Article of the Penal Law under 
which it appears.”108  Thus, if the statute had defined its terms or articulated what quantity of 
violent stories was considered sufficient to “incite to crime,” the Winters Court may have upheld 
its constitutionality despite its regulation of violent expression.  
However, the Brown Court interpreted Winters together with Stevens to hold that 
historical precedent is a prerequisite for carving out new categories of unprotected speech; a 
legislative social cost-benefit analysis is insufficient.
109
  The Court in Brown stated that “without 
persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore 
unrecognized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise the judgment [of] the 
American people,” embodied in the First Amendment, “that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
Government outweigh the costs.”110  The Brown Court stated that it might entertain the creation 
of a new exception for “violent-as-to-minors” speech “if there were a long-standing tradition in 
                                                 
107 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 513–14 (1948).  The full quote reads:  “No intent or purpose is required [by 
the statute]—no indecency or obscenity in any sense heretofore known to the law. ‘So massed as to incite to crime’ 
can become meaningful only by concrete instances. This one example is not enough.” In other words, the statute in 
Winters was too vague because juries would be forced to entertain the intractable inquiry of determining when and 
whether a book had “massed” a sufficient quantity of violent stories such that it might incite the reader to commit 
future crimes. 
108 Id.  
109 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (“New categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature 
that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”). 
110 Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
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this country of specially restricting children's access to depictions of violence.”111  Pedantically 
citing to Grimm’s Fairy Tales, Saturday morning cartoons, and Homer’s Odyssey, the Court held 
that there is no such tradition.
112
  As a result, California’s law regulating the sale of violent video 
games to minors was held a run-of-the-mill “restriction on the content of protected speech” and 
was struck down under the full weight of a strict scrutiny analysis.
113
 
4. Why Violent Expression Cannot Be Regulated Without Sex 
First, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court was following a clear trend in refusing to 
find violent speech outside the First Amendment in Stevens and Brown.  Nearly all the federal 
courts have refused in recent years to find violent but non-sexual speech obscene.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in declaring unconstitutional a Missouri statute 
that prohibited the rental or sale of violent movies to minors, held that obscenity only includes 
expressions of a sexual nature, and that material containing violence, but not sex, is not 
obscene.
114
 The Second Circuit refused to recognize as obscene trading cards that depict 
“heinous crime.”115 The Sixth Circuit would not expand its obscenity jurisprudence to include 
violent rather than sexually explicit content in video games, movies, and Internet websites.
116
 
The Seventh Circuit declared that obscene speech and speech that conveys violence “are distinct 
categories of objectionable depiction.”117 But if both categories constitute “objectionable 
depictions,” why is only sexual speech undeserving of First Amendment protection? 
The Supreme Court, through Stevens and Brown, has sent a clear message:  violent 
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116 James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2002). 
117 Am. Amusement Mach. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 23 
expression cannot be regulated.  While obscenity was removed from the First Amendment 
because of the moral harm it causes,
118
 moral harm alone can never again be grounds for 
exclusion.  By additionally requiring a tradition of suppression to establish new unprotected 
categories,
119
 the Court is functionally preventing the formation of any new categories of speech.  
States must defend their regulations by analogy to existing categories of unprotected speech 
because the Court is openly loath to find new ones.  Yet analogies to existing obscenity doctrine 
are not successful unless the regulated speech is sexual.
120
  Unless a legislature comes forward 
with data showing a history of suppressing depictions of violence, the Supreme Court has shown 
that it will apply the strictest scrutiny to regulation of violent speech.
121
  In Part III, I submit that 
the history and tradition requirement is pre-textual, and that the Court’s hesitance to exclude 
violent speech from the First Amendment stems from a refusal to offend the prevailing notion of 
masculinity in America.  
III.  OBSCENITY JURISPRUDENCE REPRESENTS A GENDERED POLICY. 
 
The disparate treatment of sex and violence under current obscenity jurisprudence can be 
seen as a manifestation of gender bias in at least four different ways.  First, Miller’s reliance on 
community standards to define what material is offensive to the point of obscene necessarily 
incorporates outdated, if still widely accepted, gender stereotypes regarding “proper” sexual 
conduct.  Second, by limiting obscenity to expression about sex, the Supreme Court has codified 
into constitutional law the idea that sex—in particular, female sexuality—is too immoral and 
                                                 
118 Roth v. United States, 346 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).  
119 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736. 
120 Compare Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that non-obscene sexual speech is outside the 
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offensive a topic for public discourse.  Third, and conversely, by expressly refusing to regulate 
violent expression, the Court furthers a male-centric, normative message that violence is not 
taboo but acceptable in public discourse, and ignores social harms which uniquely befall women.  
It is helpful to begin by identifying the normative stereotypes which pervade all four forms of 
gender bias before discussing each in turn.   
A. Prevailing Gender Stereotypes 
For millennia, dominant social groups have used gender stereotypes to control 
subordinate groups by exerting normative pressure to conform to a chosen, typically unattainable 
ideal.
122
  In America, men are the dominant social group.  Subsequently, men control the 
normative view of what it means to be masculine or feminine, including the degree to which 
sexuality and violence are considered acceptable and attractive.  Exploration of these stereotypes 
is necessary for understanding how obscenity laws permit men to retain their control, and how 
that control leads to the continued subordination of women.     
Gender stereotypes, as with all stereotypes, are contextual and idealized.
123
  Descriptive 
stereotypes describe how an individual is presumed to act based on a particular trait,
124
 as when 
all blondes are presumed to be stupid.  Prescriptive stereotypes describe how an individual 
should act based on that trait,
125
 as when a new mother is sent home early from work because 
“her place is at home with her child.”126  Prescriptive gender stereotypes exert the normative 
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pressure that functions to control, and ultimately subordinate, women, and are hence discussed 
below. 
1. American concept of masculinity 
A singular ideal of masculinity is called “hegemonic masculinity.”127  That is, although 
individuals “experience different forms of masculinity within particular contexts, one form of 
masculinity often exerts the most [social] pressure to conform to it. ‘Hegemonic’ masculinity is 
that masculinity and it works to subordinate both women and non-hegemonically masculine 
men.”128  In other words, “hegemonic masculinity is the currently most honored way of being a 
man.”129  In America, it is the “white heterosexual middle- and upper-class men who occupy 
order-giving positions in the institutions they control—particularly economic, political, and 
military institutions—[who] produce [the] hegemonic masculinity that is glorified throughout the 
culture.”130  The American prescription of the ideal man includes three central characteristics:  
masculine men are decidedly non-feminine, overtly heterosexual, and have a propensity for 
physical violence or aggression.
131
   
The first characteristic, “not feminine,” makes sense.  Indeed, most gender theorists 
acknowledge the simple fact that the dominant notion of being masculine means “doing things 
that cannot and should not be done by women.”132  Ultimately, masculinity requires men to 
                                                                                                                                                             
assumption that she had a baby to care for,” while the husband was kept later than ever, “on the assumption that he 
had a family to support.”).  
127 Cohen, supra note 122, at 520. 
128 Id. at 522. 
129 Id.  
130 Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 783 (2000).  Author’s 
Note:  Moving forward, when I discuss men as the dominant social group, I am referring to the men who fall within 
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131 Cohen, supra note 122, at 525. 
132 See Ellen Jordan, Fighting Boys and Fantasy Play: The Construction of Masculinity in the Early Years of School, 
7 GENDER & EDUC. 69, 75 (1995) (emphasis added) (discussing various theorists’ views).  
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“make it clear—eternally, compulsively, decidedly—that they are not ‘like’ women.”133  This 
characteristic is used to control and subordinate women because men seeking to reach the 
masculine ideal “reserve many socially important activities for men, [and] believe that women 
are unable to do many of the ‘important’ things that contribute to society.”134  There are 
countless historic examples of men reserving socially important functions for themselves; 
notable among them are the rights to vote, enter contracts, and own property, as well as the 
traditional distinction between “women’s work” (domestic work done in the home, which 
necessarily makes lesser contributions to society) and “men’s work” (all work outside the home, 
which necessarily makes greater contributions to society).
135
  A contemporary example is seen in 
the divergent standards for attractiveness between the sexes.  Masculine men do not wear 
makeup, shoes, or clothes that are meant to “improve” their attractiveness; the attractiveness of 
masculine men is determined by their natural features.
136
  In contrast, feminine women wear 
makeup to improve their facial features, bras to keep their breasts at teen-height, heels to make 
their legs longer and butts perkier, shapewear to keep their silhouettes smooth and hourglass-
shaped, and style their long hair to comply with attractiveness standards set by men.
137
  Women 
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who buck this standard are not only seen as unattractive, but unprofessional as well.
138
 
In addition to reserving socially important activities for men, legal codification of male 
“otherness” also subordinates women vis-à-vis the natural tendency to treat “otherness” with 
skepticism and distrust.
139
  The limitations on women’s participation in the military provide an 
important illustration.  Being able to defend one’s country with arms has historically been linked 
with fulfilling core duties of American citizenship, yet women are excluded from participation in 
ground combat and draft registration.
140
  This exclusion sends the message that, literally, men are 
full citizens in their military eligibility as compared to women.
141
  Exclusion also affords men 
more opportunities for leadership than women because of their ability to fully participate.
142
  A 
Special Operations sergeant testified that female exclusion is necessary because “the warrior 
mentality will crumble if women are placed in combat positions . . . . There needs to be that 
belief that ‘I can do this because nobody else can.”’143  In sum, central to the notion of what it 
means to be masculine is the ability to do things that are socially valued and equally unfeminine.   
Second, the masculine ideal requires that men be visibly heterosexual.  Catharine 
MacKinnon has argued that compulsory heterosexuality is an important part of hegemonic 
masculinity because it “keeps women sexually for men and men sexually inviolable.”144  Michael 
Kimmel submits that “homophobia and sexism go hand in hand” because when “men fear that 
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they will be perceived as gay by other men and thus ‘not a real man,’ [they] will exaggerate all 
the traditional rules of masculinity, including sexual predation with women.”145  Indeed, men 
who do not sufficiently exhibit their heterosexuality, regardless of their actual sexual orientation, 
may find themselves victims of persecution and even violence from “more masculine” men.146  
Assumed heterosexuality is rampant in society
147
 and the law is no exception.   For example, 
assumed heterosexuality is one of the basic reasons behind the sex segregation of prisons, 
because men as presumed heterosexuals will necessarily seek out sex with women, either 
consensually or non-consensually.
148
 It also plays an important role in laws that prohibit men 
from conducting searches of women or from being guards in women’s prisons.149  Legal 
philosopher Richard A. Wasserstrom has written that even sex-segregated bathrooms use 
presumptive heterosexuality to further the dominance of men: “The case against [sex-segregated 
bathrooms] now would rest on the ground that they are, perhaps, one small part of that scheme of 
sex-role differentiation which uses the mystery of sexual anatomy, among other things, to 
maintain the primacy of heterosexual sexual attraction [that is] central to patriarchy.”150  
But perhaps the most prominent characteristic of masculinity is the propensity for 
physical aggression.  Physical aggression is likely the most prominent characteristic of 
masculinity because it was the principal reason for man’s initial ability to literally dominate 
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women,
151
 and instantiates the power and control men retain.
152
  While we are tens of thousands 
of years past our caveman days (itself an insidious manifestation of the masculine stereotype), 
men who are the biggest and strongest are still given the highest status in American society.
153
  
For example, the multiple millions of dollars and ludicrous amount of attention we pay 
professional athletes—notably, only male athletes—for their feats of athleticism is an excellent 
demonstration.  Another is the fact that no President of the United States has ever been under six 
feet tall, even when such a height was extremely above average in the Eighteenth century (this, 
rather than overt assumptions of incompetence, may better explain why we have never had a 
female president).
154
  Boundless examples aside, scholars agree that “physical dominance, 
aggressiveness, and the use of violence to maintain male power constitute a central feature in the 
definitions of hegemonic masculinity.”155   
Commentators have also argued that requiring both heterosexuality and physical 
aggression to be considered masculine places men in a double bind:  in order to be true men, they 
must not be homosexual; yet many paths toward masculinity—such as sport, battle, and 
mentorship—involve just the sort of close, emotionally intense, and physically-oriented 
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relationships that subject men to the suspicion that they are homosexual.
156
 As Angela Harris 
describes it, “the instability of masculine identity under these circumstances makes insecure men 
easily manipulable (anxious and eager to prove their masculinity) and potentially violent (for not 
only status but also personal identity itself is at stake).”157 Thus, any natural propensity in men 
for violence is culturally exacerbated in America because this double bind creates constant doubt 
about a man’s gender identity, resulting in a cultural requirement that men constantly prove their 
manhood—to women and especially to other men—in order to be accepted as men.  
Just as this stereotype did not arise in a vacuum, neither is its perpetuation completely 
unfounded; it is unquestionable that men on the whole tend to commit violent and aggressive 
acts more than women.
158
  Indeed, “gender has consistently been advanced by criminologists as 
the strongest predictor of criminal involvement.”159  Notably, while women do commit crimes 
and other violent acts, they are significantly less likely to do so to prove their femininity the way 
men do so to prove their masculinity.
160
  Harris writes,  
Ordinarily law-abiding and peaceful men may find themselves committing violent 
criminal acts when (in public settings) their manhood is threatened by conflict 
with other men or when (in private settings) women threaten to reveal them as 
sexually inadequate, fail to submit to their patriarchal authority, or threaten to 
leave them. In these situations, the potential loss of masculinity brings shame and 
humiliation, and the man who finds these emotions intolerable may turn them into 
rage and act violently in expression of that rage.
161
 
 
The law plays a significant role in reinforcing the stereotype that masculine men have a 
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propensity for violence. That women are disallowed from combat positions in the military sends 
the message that men are uniquely suited for fighting.  Men are often prohibited from acting as 
guards to women prisoners because “men are sexual predators.”162  Yet, in Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 
163
 the Supreme Court held that women could be barred from serving as prison 
guards to male inmates on the exact same grounds.  In the eyes of the law, then, men are the 
aggressors whether they are guards or inmates.  Statutory rape laws presume the sexual predation 
of men on young women.
164
  Murder is mitigated to manslaughter when committed in the “heat 
of passion,” which both accepts and excuses that men may react violently to unmanageable 
emotions.
165
 The doctrines of incitement and fighting words similarly rely on the assumption that 
men will readily react to certain words with physical violence.  Naturally, the words that most 
often fall under the definition of fighting words are those that threaten the listener’s 
masculinity.
166
  Even where the law does not facially project this stereotype, its implementation 
picks up the slack.  For example, research suggests that police are twice as likely to arrest male 
perpetrators of domestic violence than female perpetrators.
167
  This stereotypical female-
victim/male-aggressor dichotomy pathologizes female violence and normalizes male violence, 
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thus reinforcing hegemonic masculinity.
168
 In sum, the American ideal of masculinity requires 
men to be decisively non-feminine, visibly heterosexual, and ready, willing, and able to be 
violent.  The law perpetuates these stereotypes when it incorporates gender norms into legal 
standards.   
2. American concept of femininity 
The American construct of femininity can be seen as the converse of American 
masculinity.  Hegemonic femininity and masculinity are mirror images of one another because 
men, as the dominant social group, defined both; women have never defined for themselves what 
is ideally feminine in Western society.
169
 Thus, if the masculine ideal is defined by a distinction 
from that which is feminine, a requirement of explicit heterosexual overtures, and a propensity 
for violence, ideal femininity is conversely defined by a distinction from masculinity, a cabining 
of overt sexuality, and a propensity for docility and nurturance. 
The first trait imperative to hegemonic femininity is non-masculinity.  Having decided 
that overt sexuality and violent tendencies define manhood, men socially proscribed these traits 
for women.
170
  Hence, feminine women do not display an appetite for sex or aggression.  It is 
unsurprising that non-masculinity requires passivity; dominant social groups select self-serving 
and unattainable standards for subordinate groups in order to control them.
171
  The more 
unsustainable the standard, the more effectively it controls the group attempting—and failing—
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to meet it.
172
  As Catherine MacKinnon writes: 
The discovery that the female archetype is the feminine stereotype exposed 
“woman” as a [male] social construction.  Contemporary industrial society’s 
version of her is docile, soft, passive, nurturant, vulnerable, weak, narcissistic, 
childlike, incompetent, masochistic, and domestic . . . . Women who resist or fail 
[to meet this standard] are considered less female, lesser women.  Women who 
comply or succeed are elevated as models, tokenized if they succeed on male 
terms or portrayed as [having] consent[ed] to their “natural place” and dismissed 
if they complain.
173
 
 
MacKinnon further submits that, when taken in context, “every element of the female gender 
role is revealed as, in fact, sexual.”174  According to MacKinnon, men sexually prefer those 
women who are completely void of sexual autonomy, and set the ideal feminine archetype 
accordingly.
175
  I submit that MacKinnon’s view is correct, but incomplete.  The female gender 
role was carved by male sexual preferences, but the subservience and passivity requirements are 
at least as much about retaining social control as about sex.  That is, even if all men preferred 
sexually aggressive women, idealizing that trait would encourage women to be both overtly 
sexual and overtly aggressive.  This is inapposite to the hegemonic masculinity requirement that 
men—and men only—are overtly sexual and aggressive.  Thus, under hegemonic femininity, 
women are considered masculine, and therefore unattractive, if they openly display either 
sexuality or aggression.
176
   
The Supreme Court’s leading decision on gender stereotype-based discrimination 
demonstrates how hegemonic femininity proscribes aggression and requires nurturance of 
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women.  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
177
 plaintiff Hopkins was denied partnership at her 
accounting firm despite billing more hours and bringing in more business than any other 
candidate.
178
  Clients had given her high ratings and described her as “extremely competent, 
intelligent, strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and creative . . . decisive[], and . . . a 
stimulating conversationalist.”179  Opposition to her partnership was based solely on a perceived 
lack of warmth and “interpersonal skills,” rather than objective job performance.180  In her 
evaluations, partners wrote that Hopkins was “overbearing, arrogant, [and] abrasive,” and 
“overly aggressive, unduly harsh, [and] difficult to work with.”181  In the words of the Court, 
“one partner described her as ‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a 
woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course in charm school.’”182  Several of the male 
candidates were also characterized as abrasive and overbearing, though “no one suggested charm 
school for them.”183  Despite Hopkins’ “work-related competence (or perhaps because of it), she 
was seen as behaving in ways that are considered inappropriate for women.”184  Although 
Hopkins prevailed after seven years, most of the judges deemed hers a “close case” of 
discrimination.
185
   
The non-masculinity requirement proscribes more than just aggression for women.  A 
study of male and female leaders shows that women who act authoritatively will be viewed as 
masculine—and subsequently scorned—despite that such a trait is desirable in a leader:   
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 [F]emale leaders were devalued relative to men when they behaved in an 
autocratic and directive manner and when they worked in male-dominated fields 
(e.g., in the military, as athletic coaches). By contrast, women who led in a 
participatory or democratic style were evaluated as positively as their male 
counterparts. Thus, the devaluation of female leaders was restricted to incidents in 
which women behaved in ways that were stereotypically masculine, behaviors 
that may have disrupted “traditional patterns of gender deference.” . . . Such 
women may be particularly vulnerable to having their interpersonal abilities and 
personality derogated, although their work-related, instrumental strengths may be 
acknowledged.
186
 
 
Additionally, the study revealed that men have a greater tendency to hold traditional prescriptive 
beliefs that women “should not act like men”; they will scorn a woman who bucks the feminine 
ideal more quickly and more severely than will other women.
187
   
The second trait imperative to femininity, concerning female sexuality, is two-fold:  its 
descriptive component sees women as inherently, dangerously sexual;
188
 its prescriptive 
component requires constant restraint of this unbridled sexuality.
189
  This ideology portrays non-
procreative sex as sinful and women as beholden to their sexual impulses—and therefore in 
perpetual need of societal control.
190
  Women are thus socially categorized by whether they cave 
to their sexual natures; there are “bad” girls whose sexuality tempts men to sin, depravity, and 
squalor, and “good” girls who tolerate sex for procreation but do not engage in it for self-
fulfillment, let alone outside of male-prescribed parameters.
191
  The “good/bad girl” division is 
manifested in a multitude of female stereotypes: a woman is either madonna or whore, virgin or 
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vamp, helpless schoolgirl or lust-crazed dominatrix.  Even the Supreme Court has characterized 
this dichotomy as “one of the most insidious of the old myths about women[;] that women, 
wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects [or] . . . placed upon a pedestal[.]”192   
While hegemonic masculinity requires men to display their heterosexuality to the point of 
conspicuousness, the open display of sexuality by women is considered “profoundly dangerous 
to men and to civilization.”193  Woman’s sinful sexuality constantly tempts men not merely 
toward immorality, but “away from the business of creating and maintaining civilization, from 
pursuit of science, of government, of war, of commerce, and of invention.  If women are not 
supervised and controlled, if their unruly sexuality is not repressed and regulated (for it cannot be 
tamed), civilization itself will fall.”194 
This ideology is reflected in the societal and legal treatment of women throughout 
history.  American women seeking sexual autonomy have been publicly branded, stoned, 
sequestered, institutionalized as insane, jailed as prostitutes, burned as witches, and driven to 
suicide by persecution.
195
  While male adulterers “did not deserve” death for their transgression, 
a wronged husband may have been entitled to exact such a punishment on his unfaithful wife.
196
 
Statutory rape laws arose not merely out of a paternalistic concern to protect young women from 
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exploitation, but at least as much from the desire to “control their burgeoning sexuality.”197  
Married women could not be trusted with such basic freedoms as the right to own property, to 
vote, to sign contracts, or to have custody of children,
198
 both because women were deemed to 
lack the intellectual capacity to contribute, and because their sex-driven impulses would 
“misguide, deceive, or drain mankind and keep him from his weighty accomplishments.”199 
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century women were punished for seeking freer sexual expression in 
dress, dating, dance, and domestic life, as well as fighting against sexual double standards that 
created “fallen” women out of girls raped, seduced, or simply sexually active.200  Social “purity” 
movements have been periodically “necessary” to ensure that all sexual expression by women 
was stamped out.
201
   
Although Western women have gained many social and political rights previously denied 
them, the sin-sex nexus
202
 continues to limit women’s full social and legal participation.203  The 
hegemonic femininity requirement that women cabin their sexuality results in the repression of 
their sexual autonomy.  When the law steps in to regulate female sexuality in ways it does not 
(and I submit will never) regulate male sexuality, it is reflecting hegemonic femininity in a way 
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that heartily contributes to the suppression of female sexual autonomy.  
Most laws regulate female sexuality indirectly; the most direct are those that obstruct 
access to contraception and abortion, which leave women but not men threatened with unwanted 
pregnancy.
204
  Scholars argue that a traditional double standard, which requires premarital 
chastity and marital fidelity of women but not of men, animates much abortion regulation.
205
 
Courts and legislatures take for granted that government intervention into women’s decision-
making to prevent pregnancy is a legitimate means to a legitimate societal goal.
206
  While men 
are “not punished” for premarital sex, “‘moral’ considerations justify laws that impose 
devastating legal, social, financial, and health consequences upon women who become pregnant 
through ‘disfavored’ sex.”207  Significantly, that most abortion laws allow an abortion when the 
pregnancy results from rape or incest
208
 reflects the legal consideration of pregnancy and 
parenthood as “just deserts” for women who choose to have sex.  That is, only where sex is 
involuntary and outside male-sanctioned parameters does a woman “deserve” to be allowed an 
abortion; if she got pregnant while exercising sexual autonomy, she loses the privilege of 
choosing not to have the child.  Recent trends in abortion regulation like outright bans on certain 
types of abortions,
209
 mandatory “waiting periods,”210 and parental or spousal notification 
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provisions
211
 have only served to underscore the hegemonic femininity stereotype that women 
cannot and should not make sexual decisions for themselves.  
Moreover, the law furthers hegemonic femininity by suppressing female sexual 
autonomy in its regulation of sexual education and information.  The federal government spends 
hundreds of millions of dollars yearly on “abstinence-only-until-marriage” programs given to 
young people in public schools, churches, and community centers.
212
  These programs instruct 
that all birth control is dangerous, condoms are ineffective in preventing pregnancy, and that 
HIV and other STDs can pass through a condom.
213
  Kim Buchanan argues that 
[r]ather than challenging societal expectations of male sexual irresponsibility and 
punitive attitudes toward women who are sexually active, [abstinence-only] 
programs reinforce this double standard in the hope that it will force young 
women to stop themselves from having sex. Accordingly, these programs teach 
that premarital sex inevitably results in financial and emotional ruin for young 
women, while enhancing the reputation of young men.
214
 
 
Likewise, “marriage promotion curricula” funded by the federal government seek to 
mandate the sexual behavior of young and low-income women under the Welfare Reform Act.
215
  
The Congressional findings supporting this legislation explicitly attribute poverty to unwed 
pregnancy and unwed motherhood.
216
  Such federally funded programs pressure poor women—
but not men—to get married as a strategy for escaping poverty, yet fail to offer any economic 
guidance from which women (or their prospective husbands) might learn to support themselves 
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and their children.
217
  Similarly, if a woman wants to avoid punitive “family cap” reductions in 
benefits for giving birth while on welfare, she must use a method of contraception that cannot be 
reversed except by medical intervention.
218
  If she uses a less invasive method of birth control 
such as oral contraceptives or condoms, she and her children will be subject to a reduction in 
benefits.
219
  The Welfare Reform Act thus signals that sexual abstinence of women, but not of 
men, is more integral to ending poverty than financial education.  By limiting women’s access to 
birth control, abortions, and, most significantly, accurate information about their own health, the 
law suppresses female sexuality in order to comport with the prevailing stereotype of femininity.  
 In sum, hegemonic femininity exerts normative pressure on women to behave unlike 
men, cabin their sexual urges, and be passive rather than aggressive.  
B. Gender Bias #1 – Insidious “Community Standards”  
The constitutional obscenity standard, aka the inherent morality standard, explicitly 
permits and implicitly requires that these prescriptive gender stereotypes are encompassed in the 
definition of obscenity.  That is, material is deemed obscene if it is patently offensive according 
to “community standards.” The problem is that the community standards themselves are not 
proved to the jury as an element of the offense, but rather are decided by the jury.
220
  Jurors are 
thus able—and more importantly, are required—to subsume whatever biases about “proper” 
sexual conduct are held in the community into the constitutional standard for obscenity. 
While courts may technically admit evidence of community standards, such evidence is 
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regularly excluded.
221
  Hence, the opportunity to discriminate arises because the jury is presumed 
to know the community standards.  This problem is compounded by the fact that jurors are not 
meant to apply their own sense of offensiveness, but to apply the offensiveness standards of the 
mythical “average person” in their community.222  Such guesstimating is routine in some areas of 
the law, as when the knowledge of a “reasonable person” is imputed to a defendant charged with 
negligence.
223
  However, that “reasonable person” standard is designed to limit jurors’ biases by 
requiring them to imagine what a less-biased (i.e., more reasonable) person would do in the 
circumstance presented.
224
  In contrast, the standard for defining community standards does not 
ask jurors to set aside their biases; rather, it requires that they incorporate into the constitutional 
standard not only their individual bias, but all biases known or apparent in their community.   
It is imprudent to disregard the fact that people are influenced, sometimes 
subconsciously, by their perception of the opinions, values, and expectations of others.  As Diana 
Burgess and Eugene Borgida write: 
[S]tereotypes are learned sociocultural representations that may continue to be 
held even when individuals do not personally endorse them. Even a person who 
holds egalitarian beliefs about what is appropriate for men and women possesses 
descriptive knowledge of the characteristics, roles, and behaviors that constitute 
gender stereotypes. Even for those who claim to endorse equal rights, 
liberalization of (gender) roles and the like, stereotypic associations to gender are 
virtually automatic, emerging without any obvious conscious processing when a 
person is confronted with a member of the category.
225
 
 
Similarly, a study by James Fields and Howard Schuman strongly suggests that people look out 
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into the community and see their own opinions reflected back.
226
  Thus, there is a strong 
tendency to perceive community agreement with one’s self, because people impute their own 
opinions to the community at large.  Perceived self-community agreement is exacerbated in the 
absence of information to the contrary,
227
 as is the case in the majority of obscenity cases.
228
  In 
addition to projecting their own views, jurors are also likely to shift their opinion of 
offensiveness toward what they believe is the most mainstream view of appropriate sexual 
conduct in an attempt to reflect a broad cross-section of their community.
229
  Moreover, jury 
selection typically serves to aggravate, rather than mitigate, the weight of private biases.
230
  For 
example, one manual to assist prosecutors in selecting a jury for an obscenity reads as follows: 
[A] juror with the following characteristics would be ideal: (1) a native of the 
community, or in the alternative, originally from a smaller town or community; 
(2) married people with families, especially those with daughters, granddaughters, 
and/or small children or grandchildren; (3) active church members; (4) at least 40 
years of age; (5) active in community clubs and activities; (6) presently living in a 
small community; (7) little or no exposure to pornography; (8) politically 
conservative; (9) agreement with the state’s right to enact obscenity and child 
pornography laws; (10) people who own their own homes rather than rent.
231
 
 
Prosecutors would want to select these obviously conservative jurors as they are more likely to 
convict than those with more open-minded views on what sexual conduct is offensive.
232
  While 
defense counsel would naturally seek to select jurors with liberal or minority views on sexuality, 
it is unlikely defense counsel would able to ensure they remain on the jury; attorneys can strike 
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jurors, not prevent them from being struck and the prosecutor may have enough peremptory 
strikes to remove them.
233
  It is easy to see, then, how effortlessly long-standing sexual 
stereotypes are incorporated into the constitutional definition of obscenity.   
C. Gender Bias #2:  Keeping Sex Taboo Enforces Negative Sexual Stereotypes 
Central to the concept of obscenity is that some materials should not be available for 
public consumption.  Thus, the inherent morality standard essentially asks whether the 
objectionable material is best left “behind the curtain of privacy which our customs draw[.]”234  
By limiting the scope of obscenity jurisprudence to speech about sex, the Supreme Court has 
codified into constitutional law the idea that sex—and in particular, female sexuality—is too 
immoral and offensive a topic for public discourse.   In practice, keeping sex taboo forces juries 
in obscenity cases to rely on normative sexual stereotypes because the lack of public discourse 
precludes basing “community standards” on actual community practices.  And when the 
prevailing sexual stereotypes consider overt female sexuality taboo, obscenity laws function to 
stifle women’s sexual autonomy and perpetuate their subordination. 
1. Societal Function of Sexual Taboos 
In her book, Purity and Danger:  An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, Mary 
Douglas submits that a culture will find taboo those things that challenge its fundamental 
conceptual categories.
235
  In other words, if something profoundly troubles the self-identity of 
the members of the culture, the culture will find that thing “unnatural,” and its presence will 
trigger deep disgust.
236
  As the dominant social group defines these normative categories, its 
                                                 
233 Id.  
234 Peterson, supra note 220, at 645 (quoting the Model Penal Code).  
235 MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER:  AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO, 34–36 (1966).  
236 Id.  
 44 
members are both more likely to be offended by challenges to existing categories, and are best-
situated to quash such challenges.
237
  Moreover, dominant social groups naturally draw 
normative distinctions that are self-serving.
238
  
In America, sexually explicit material is taboo because it challenges the fundamental 
categorization of our lives into separate spheres of private and public life.
239
  That is, societal 
norms dictate what details about our sexuality should be known to others (i.e., our public lives) 
and what should remain behind closed doors (i.e., our private lives).  Significantly, however, 
sexual norms vary for different groups of people.   For example, heterosexual couples can hold 
hands and kiss in public without fear of offending social mores, while the same cannot be said 
for homosexual couples in many parts of this country.
240
  Likewise, hegemonic masculinity and 
femininity instruct that men may publicly display their sexual selves, while women may not.
241
  
In other words, the traditional “public sex life” sphere is much larger for men than it is for 
women, who must cabin their sexuality or be seen as unfeminine.  Hence, when any of us 
transgresses the normative sexual stereotypes encompassed in hegemonic masculinity and 
femininity, we challenge the very identity of the controlling social group.  When that 
transgression involves an explicit public look at something hegemonic masculinity deems 
private—such as an unabashed exhibition of female sexual autonomy—it is called obscene.242  
                                                 
237 Id. at 4-6.  
238 E.g., heterosexuals have long claimed the normalcy of heterosexuality and abnormality of homosexuality. 
239 Peterson, supra note 220, at 655.  
240 Id. at 656 (“Heterosexuals can reveal substantial portions of their erotic lives in many public and semi-public 
places, but gays and lesbians must keep practically all of their erotic experience out of sight, if they are concerned 
about giving offense by ‘flaunting it.’”). 
241 See Part III.A.2 infra.  
242 See Peterson, supra note 220, at 626 (discussing the obscenity conviction of performance artist and porn actress 
Annie Sprinkle for an all-female sex video exhibited to celebrate the publication of a university magazine of lesbian 
erotica).   
 45 
The real-world impact of sexual taboos cannot be overstated.  Theorists of sexuality long 
ago explained the importance of prohibition to sexual desire.  Sigmund Freud wrote: “Some 
obstacle is necessary to swell the tide of the libido to its height; and at all periods of history, 
wherever natural barriers in the way of satisfaction have not sufficed, mankind has erected 
conventional ones in order to be able to enjoy love.”243  Georges Bataille argued that the pleasure 
of pornography depends on an accompanying prohibition that it appears to transgress.
244
  In 
short, taboos are like a metaphorical car accident; the more we’re told to avert our eyes, the more 
fascinated we become with stealing a peek.  In this way, sexually explicit material gains rather 
than loses social significance when it is proscribed.
245
   Indeed, Professor Meyer argues that the 
subordinating nature of pornography is due at least as much to its taboo nature, which renders its 
private viewing a male-only event, as to its misogynist content.
246
  
More importantly, however, recent research has affirmatively proven a causal connection 
between legally-sanctioned taboos and actual moral beliefs of the public: 
Little is known regarding what obscenity laws do and whether the rationales put 
forth by policy-makers are empirically justified.  If [obscenity standards] give 
people more room for sexually progressive expression and greater social 
acceptance of alternative behaviors, then more progressive community standards 
would make it easier to subsequently challenge restrictive obscenity regulations, 
leading to multiple steady states through which abrupt shifts in norms can occur. . 
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. . Using the random assignment of U.S. federal judges . . . we found that 
progressive obscenity standards increase progressive sexual attitudes, non-marital 
sexual behavior especially by men, arrests for prostitution, rape, and drug 
violations, [but] . . . reduc[ed] arrests for offenses against family and children. . . . 
To corroborate a causal channel we conduct a field experiment by assigning 
workers to transcribe obscenity news reports. Exposure to progressive obscenity 
decisions leads to more progressive sexual attitudes but not to self-reported sexual 
behavior.  A second field experiment documents that exposure to conservative 
obscenity decisions leads to beliefs that premarital, extramarital, and homosexual 
sex are more prevalent.
247
   
 
In short, then, obscenity jurisprudence influences the public’s actual beliefs and values, 
illuminating the boundary between acceptable and obscene.  By singling out depictions of sexual 
activity as the only material offensive enough to be obscene, obscenity law signals that “the 
sexual is sinful, and that eros—female eros in particular—is not only problematic, but also a 
central source of social evil.”248   
2. Suppressing Sexual Discourse Suppresses Female Sexuality 
How suppressing only speech about sex eschews female sexuality can be explained in 
two ways.  First, the “community standards” prong of the inherent morality standard ensures that 
a singular majoritarian (i.e., male) view of sexual morality prevails over all others.  Second, from 
its inception until current day, every development of obscenity law grew out of a conservative 
movement to stop the democratization and liberation of female sexuality.   
 First, “community standards” are meant to be the legally-sanctioned boundary between 
our public and private sexual lives.
249
  Yet it is impossible to define a community’s standards 
regarding a taboo subject matter without reliance on stereotypes.  That is, community standards 
                                                 
247 Daniel L. Chen & Susan Yeh, How Do Rights Revolutions Occur? Theory and Evidence from First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 1958-2008, Columbia University Political Economy Seminar (October 2012).   
248 Meyer, supra note 188, at 1140.  
249 Peterson, supra note 220, at 655.  
 47 
cannot be based on actual beliefs and practices in the absence of some community discourse.  
For example, a jury could easily agree on a community standard about the proper driving of a car 
because people generally will openly discuss their own and others’ driving behavior; we know 
what our neighbors think is good and bad driving.  In contrast, so long as sex is taboo, sexuality 
is not openly discussed and deliberated by the community; we know much less about what our 
neighbors think about the extreme sexual behavior likely to be at issue in an obscenity case.  
Subsequently, juries must use the normative boundaries selected by the dominant social group to 
inform their decision because the lack of public discourse about sex precludes basing 
“community standards” on actual community beliefs and practices.   In this way, keeping sex 
taboo mandates the perpetuation of sexual stereotypes, and results in the continued suppression 
of female sexuality in accordance with those stereotypes.
250
  
Second, obscenity law has developed reactively, as opposed to proactively.  Scholars 
generally agree on the timeline of its development, which shows that both the legal theory and 
prosecution of obscenity have advanced periodically, rather than constantly.
251
  Obscenity law 
first gained momentum around 1842, and remained a hot legal issue until the passage of the 
Comstock Act in 1873, which banned obscene literature from the mail.
252
  A resulting climate of 
sexual repression prevailed until around 1913, when federal judges began to openly question the 
“rule as laid down, however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals.”253  This period 
lasted until around 1930, when obscenity doctrine officially broke with its Victorian past by 
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shifting to a “reasonable person” standard, rather than Hicklin’s “susceptible person” standard.254  
Repression again prevailed until the late 1950’s, when the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roth v. United States
255
 loosened restrictions on the sale of sexually explicit material 
to adults.
256
  From 1957 on, obscenity has remained a popular topic of discussion.  Of note, the 
Miller standard was promulgated by the Court in 1973, when the modern feminist movement 
was gaining ground.  Then, theorists Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin attempted in 
the 1980’s and 90’s to suppress pornography as a violation of women's civil rights.257  Today, 
controversies over the ubiquitous availability of sexually explicit images and teen sexting 
dominate the conversation.
258
   
Significantly, each period of advancement in obscenity law corresponds with a social 
movement advocating freer sexual expression, particularly for women.  These progressive 
movements are the very same that allowed women to gain civil rights previously denied them.   
For every sexually progressive social movement, there was a corresponding conservative 
backlash.
259
  In short, because men have never needed social permission or encouragement to 
freely express their sexuality,
260
 the stifling of social progress toward freer sexual expression 
functioned to stifle the sexuality of women only.   
There was a “free love” movement in the mid-Nineteenth century—a “middle-class, 
bohemian cause that opposed marriage and supported sexual relationships rooted in ‘passional 
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attraction’ rather than law.”261  Women contemporaneously gained the rights to enter contracts, 
execute wills, own or control property, work outside the home, and receive trade licenses.
262
   At 
this time, a work was obscene if it had a “tendency to corrupt the morals”263 of a person 
susceptible to offense at lewd materials.  This vague standard prevailed throughout the 
Nineteenth century, and might have rendered obscenity laws “an expansive tool” for the 
proscription of an extremely broad range of purportedly dangerous or immoral materials.
264
  Yet 
obscenity laws were not used to prosecute any and all materials that might be morally corruptive 
to a susceptible audience.  Instead, Nineteenth century obscenity prosecutions typically targeted 
works describing “female sexual desire, knowledge, or pleasure, usually narrated by women in 
the first person,”265 because such works were in contravention of the prevailing notions about the 
supposedly innate chastity and lack of libido in women.  As Professor Donna Dennis writes,  
new middle-class norms that arose in the first half of the nineteenth century 
prescribed sexual purity and “passionlessness” for women. Indeed, a primary 
cultural achievement of the antebellum bourgeoisie was its assertion of 
fundamental sexual differences between men and women. By eliding sexual 
difference and highlighting feminine pleasure, erotic tales narrated by women flew 
in the face of bourgeois conventions enshrining female piety and chastity.
266
 
 
Moreover, a work need not have been erotic to be obscene in the Nineteenth century; obscenity 
charges were triggered whenever there was an overt representation of feminine sexual agency.  
For example, sellers of The Secrets of the Female Sex were frequently prosecuted, despite that 
the book was an austere anti-masturbation tract.
267
  Apparently, “the book’s discussion of 
sexually aroused girls and young women, even though it dwelled on the morbid consequences of 
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their physical explorations, ran directly afoul of the emerging legal taboo against expressions of 
female desire.”268  
 The next period of obscenity development was the 1920’s, which was similarly a time of 
social and legal upheaval for women in America.  During this era, the Nineteenth Amendment 
granted women the right to vote, Alice Paul drafted the first Equal Rights Amendment, Margaret 
Sanger founded the American Birth Control League, and, upon being allowed some formal 
education, women gained recognition in male-dominated fields like politics,
269
 business,
270
 
aviation,
271
 science,
272
 and literature.
273
  Moreover, the Jazz Age immediately drums up images 
of flappers, those women who flouted traditional gender norms by cutting their hair short, 
wearing masculine clothes, drinking hard liquor, smoking cigarettes, and having social lives 
independent of men.  While their mothers had devoted themselves to securing voting rights, 
organizing unions, and establishing settlement houses, flappers “were interested in a different 
form of liberation—the kind that gave them the right to enjoy themselves in the same ways men 
did[.]”274  Outraged by the audacity of these sexually brazen women, and by the hedonism of the 
time generally, an anti-obscenity movement grew out of the urban centers of the time.
275
  
Prosecutions for obscenity rose, and literature condemning the effects of reading, seeing, or 
learning about sex proliferated.
276
  Yet, the legal theory of obscenity saw progressive 
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development.  Dismissing the “Victorian morals” which the “susceptible person” standard277 
represented, Judge Learned Hand suggested that honest treatment of sex ought not to be 
proscribed, commenting that “it seems hardly likely that we are . . . content to reduce our 
treatment of sex to the standard of a child’s library in the supposed interest of a salacious few, or 
that shame will for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the most serious and 
beautiful sides of human nature.”278  But perhaps realizing that society was not yet ready for such 
complete sexual honesty, he settled for arguing that “the word ‘obscene’ be allowed to indicate 
the present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community 
may have arrived here and now.”279   
During World War II, the substantial population of American men who were on active 
military duty simultaneously created an enormous hole in the American workforce and a 
dramatic increase in demand for pornography.  While women filled the vacant jobs, the wartime 
popularity of “pinups” and pornography helped usher sexual images into mainstream culture.280  
In response to the increased volume and acceptance of sexual images, as well as the showing of 
female autonomy in the absence of men, the fiercest conservative movement of the Twentieth 
century arose in the 1950’s.281  Women were encouraged to leave the workforce and return to the 
home, so that men returning from war could once again fill the marketplace jobs.  While nearly 
half (47%) of women aged 18-24 were enrolled in higher education in 1920, that number 
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dropped to just thirty percent by 1950.
282
  Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique discusses how 
severely this conservatism stifled women: 
In the fifteen years after World War II, the mystique of feminine fulfillment 
became the cherished core of contemporary American culture. Millions of women 
lived their lives in the image of pretty pictures of the American suburban 
housewife, kissing their husbands goodbye in front of the picture window, 
depositing their station-wagons full of children at school, and smiling as they ran 
the new electric waxer over the spotless kitchen floor. Their only dream was to be 
perfect wives and mothers. . . . The problem was a strange stirring, a sense of 
dissatisfaction, a yearning that women suffered in the middle of the twentieth 
century in the United States. Each suburban wife struggled with it alone. As she 
made the beds, shopped for groceries, [and] . . . lay beside her husband at night—
she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent question—Is this all? 
For over fifteen years there was no word of this yearning in the millions of 
words written about women, for women, in all the columns, books and articles by 
experts telling women their role was to seek fulfillment as wives and mothers. 
Over and over women heard in voices of tradition and of Freudian sophistication 
that they could desire no greater destiny than to glory in their own femininity. 
They were taught to pity the neurotic, unfeminine, unhappy women who wanted 
to be poets or physicists or presidents. They learned that truly feminine women do 
not want careers, higher education, political rights. . . . All they had to do was 
devote their lives from earliest girlhood to finding a husband and bearing children 
[and] a thousand expert voices applauded their femininity, their adjustment, their 
new maturity. 
283
 
 
Along with this conservative movement came renewed anti-smut campaigns and tightened 
obscenity laws.
284
  But the anti-pornography campaigns of the 1950’s met with greater resistance 
than had similar campaigns at the turn of the century,
285
 and the Supreme Court in Roth affirmed 
that societal attitudes regarding “proper” sexual conduct could not be turned all the way back to 
Victorian mores.
286
  Whatever its flaws, Roth was the first time the Court had placed 
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constitutional limits on the suppression of sexual expression.  Yet, there is no doubt that this 
development came only after a century of working to establish some sexual freedom for women.    
 Finally, the refusal to expand the scope of obscenity jurisprudence to speech other than 
that about sex has constitutionalized the notion that sex—and in particular, female sexuality—is 
unacceptable for public discourse.  In practice, keeping sex taboo has mandated reliance on 
normative sexual stereotypes to define obscenity, because the lack of public discourse precludes 
basing “community standards” on the actual beliefs and practices of the community.  Because 
the prevailing sexual stereotypes consider overt female sexuality taboo, obscenity laws function 
to stifle women’s sexual autonomy and perpetuate their subordination. 
D. Gender Bias #3:  Preventing Violence From Being Taboo  
There are two reasons why the Supreme Court has expressly refused to limit violent 
speech.  First, holding that depictions or descriptions of extreme violence are offensive to the 
point of obscene would contravene hegemonic masculinity.  Masculinity is associated with 
power and strength in America, and the Supreme Court, or perhaps certain of its individual 
members, will not take action that it feels undermines its strength and power in the eyes of the 
American public.  Second, the Court has thus far only been able to recognize that speech which 
leads to violence, as opposed to that which depicts violence, is harmful, because only the former 
affects the men who have shaped First Amendment jurisprudence.
287
     
According to hegemonic masculinity, men have a propensity for violence.
288
  In keeping 
with the masculine stereotype, men should not find depictions or descriptions of violence 
                                                 
287 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 783 (2000) 
(referring to the “white heterosexual middle- and upper-class men who occupy order-giving positions in the 
institutions they control--particularly economic, political, and military institutions—[who] produce [the] hegemonic 
masculinity that is glorified throughout the culture”).  
288 See Part III.A.1, supra.  
 54 
offensive.  Quite contrarily, violence is glorified in the realm of the masculine.
289
   As Angela 
Harris writes, “[m]anliness is one of those ideas that is often made real with violence . . . men 
use violence or the threat of violence as an affirmative way of proving individual or collective 
masculinity, or in desperation when they perceive their masculine self-identity to be under 
attack.”290  Indeed, the more violent a man appears, the more “manly” he is considered.291   
Moreover, it is axiomatic that masculinity is often considered synonymous with strength 
and power.
292
  This is the primary reason that the Supreme Court will not recognize violent 
speech as obscene or otherwise outside of the First Amendment:  because doing so would offend 
the prevailing notion of masculinity and thus make the Court look less powerful.  The Court’s 
given reason for voiding as unconstitutionally vague the California and Congressional laws that 
applied the inherent morality standard to violent speech was the absence of an historical 
consensus on what depictions of violence cross the boundary between acceptable and offensive.  
However, as evidenced by the fact that nearly all states have enacted or attempted some form of 
legislation aimed at curbing violent expression,
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 it is clear that there is some consensus that 
America’s violent expressions have, as of late, “exceeded common limits of custom and 
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candor.”294  Therefore, I submit that the current conservative bench would rather err on the side 
of non-censorship than offend the dominant concept of American masculinity, lest such a move 
undermine the Court’s public image.  The Court’s stance is quite unfortunate, because, as David 
S. Cohen points out, “when the law complies with [hegemonic] notions of how men and women 
should behave, desire, and feel and allows institutions to build and construct those notions, the 
law is furthering sex-role stereotyping of men and women. Furthermore, it perpetuates the 
association of power—which has been traditionally masculine—with men[.]”295 
The second way that the refusal to cabin violent expression can be seen as gender bias is 
a common theme in feminist theory:  that the masculine viewpoint is considered the objectively 
neutral viewpoint renders the law an inherently masculine structure, redressing only the harms 
felt by men.
296
 Catherine MacKinnon wrote that male dominance is “perhaps the most pervasive 
and tenacious system of power in history . . . it is metaphysically nearly perfect. Its point of view 
is the standard for point-of-viewlessness, its particularity the meaning of universality.”297 And 
Richard Collier stated that “law is not simply equated with men's power.  Law constitute[s] 
men's power in its purest form. . . . The law sees and treats women the way men see and treat 
women. Law's purported neutrality is simply a mask for the masculinity of its judgments.”298   
To illustrate this point, I pose the question:  Why are fighting words proscribable while 
speech about violence that does not lead to immediate physical violence is not?  Because in the 
former, men feel their attendant harms.  That is, when men get so offended by a speaker’s words 
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that they would punch him, those offensive words are wholly without First Amendment 
protection and may be banned at law.  However, since hegemonic femininity instructs that 
women are socially forbidden from reacting to verbal assault with physical aggression, the 
fighting words doctrine does not offer women protection from verbal assault as it does men.  
Conversely, the law does not even recognize, let alone punish, offensive speech that is directed at 
women in the public sphere.  Street harassment is an epidemic the world over, causing women to 
fear assault on their moral character as well as physical person as they walk in their own 
neighborhoods.  But because street harassment is a harm men do not feel, women are told to 
“simply avert their eyes.”   
 The Court ignores vast amounts of empirical data showing at least a correlative 
connection, if not causal connection, between realistic depictions of violence and violent acts.  
The Court’s willful blindness seems particularly imprudent in the face of an alarming rise in 
school shootings by teenaged boys who play endless hours of extremely violent video games.  
Further, that the Court is willing to disregard that new technologies seriously increase the 
ubiquity, interactivity, effectiveness, and impressionability of violent images on viewers solely to 
protect its appearance of power (and by extension, masculinity) is troubling.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, the disparate treatment of sex and violence under current obscenity jurisprudence 
can be seen as a manifestation of gender bias in several ways.  Relying on community standards 
to define what material is offensive to the point of obscene necessarily incorporates insidious 
gender stereotypes regarding “proper” sexual conduct.  These stereotypes hold that traits of 
sexuality and violence are the exclusive province of men.  By limiting the scope of obscenity to 
the topic of sex, the Supreme Court constitutionalizes the notion that sexuality—female sexuality 
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especially—is too immoral and offensive a topic for public discourse.  The refusal to regulate 
speech on the topic of violence according to the same standard when the same harms are present 
furthers the normative masculine stereotype that glorifies violence.  When the law complies with 
hegemonic notions of how men and women should behave, it is inappropriately furthering sexual 
stereotypes, which function to suppress the sexuality of the men and women whose preferences 
may diverge from the governing norms.  Legal codification of sexual stereotypes is something 
the law should seek to eradicate, not perpetuate.   
 
